Obsolescence in Aerospace and Defence: DMSMS, AS9120B, and DoD Sourcing

What DMSMS Is

DMSMS stands for Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages. It is the formal DoD framework for identifying, assessing, and resolving the loss of manufacturers and suppliers for parts, materials, and processes critical to the continued production and sustainment of defense systems.

The DMSMS Guidebook, published by the Defense Acquisition University, defines the process: identify items at risk through proactive BOM monitoring, assess the impact of the risk on system availability and mission readiness, and resolve the risk through one of several approved resolution strategies before it becomes a support crisis.

DMSMS is not limited to electronic components, though electronics are the most common and most rapidly evolving category. It also applies to materials, mechanical parts, and manufacturing processes that are no longer commercially available. A proprietary connector or a specialized thermal management material can be as much of a DMSMS issue as a discontinued FPGA.

What makes DMSMS different from standard commercial obsolescence management is the scale of the service life horizon and the regulatory framework around resolution. A commercial OEM might plan for five to ten years of production and three to five years of aftermarket. A defense prime contractor managing a platform with a fifty-year service requirement is planning across a fundamentally different timeframe.

The Regulatory and Contractual Framework

DFARS and NDAA Section 818 The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) contains specific requirements for counterfeit electronic parts avoidance in defense contracts. DFARS 252.246-7007 requires contractors to maintain a counterfeit electronic parts detection and avoidance system and to flow these requirements down to subcontractors and suppliers. NDAA 2012, Section 818, established civil and criminal penalties for contractors who knowingly supply counterfeit parts to the DoD, and created the requirement for contractors to report the detection of suspect counterfeit parts.

These are not voluntary guidelines. They are contractual requirements that flow through the defense supply chain. A subcontractor or distributor that supplies a suspect counterfeit part to a prime contractor in a DoD programme may be liable under the False Claims Act. The regulatory stakes in defence sourcing have no equivalent in commercial electronics.

AS9120B: Quality Management for Aerospace and Defence Distributors AS9120B (SAE International) is the Quality Management System standard for distributors in the aviation, space, and defence industries. It defines requirements for receiving inspection, traceability, storage, and counterfeit parts avoidance that go beyond the requirements of ISO 9001 or AS9100. A distributor holding AS9120B certification has been audited to these requirements by an accredited third party.

AS9120B is not the same as AS6081, which is the SAE standard for counterfeit electronic parts avoidance programs. AS6081 defines the test methods and inspection practices for counterfeit detection. AS9120B defines the quality management system within which those practices must operate. In practice, a fully compliant aerospace and defence distributor holds AS9120B certification and operates to AS6081 for incoming inspection.

AS6081 and Supplier Qualification AS6081 (SAE International) is the standard for fraudulent and counterfeit electronic parts avoidance for independent distributors. It defines requirements for source selection, receiving inspection, and test methods, and references AS6171 for the specific inspection procedures. For defence procurement, AS6081 compliance is increasingly required by prime contractors as a condition of approved supplier status.

The DoD Supply Chain: DLA, QSLD, and Prime Contractor Obligations

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the DoD's primary logistics support organization. DLA Land and Maritime and DLA Aviation manage electronic parts procurement for military applications. DLA maintains the Qualified Suppliers List for Distributors (QSLD), a list of independent distributors that have been assessed to DLA's requirements for counterfeit parts avoidance. A QSLD-approved distributor has passed DLA's supplier assessment and is approved for open market procurement on DLA contracts.

For program-specific procurement outside DLA direct purchase, prime contractors operate their own approved supplier programs and are responsible for ensuring that their supply chains comply with DFARS counterfeit parts requirements. The obligation does not stop at the first tier. Under DFARS 252.246-7007, the prime must flow requirements to subcontractors and suppliers at all levels.

DMSMS Resolution Strategies

When a DMSMS event is identified, the program office or contractor responsible for sustainment must select and execute a resolution strategy. The choice depends on the number of units affected, the remaining service life of the system, the availability of alternatives, and the cost and schedule impact of each option.

Lifetime buy (last-time-buy) The most commonly used short-term resolution: ordering enough of the original component to sustain production and support requirements for the remaining service life. Effective when the component is still available through authorized channels and the LTB quantity can be stored under appropriate conditions. In long-service programs, the required quantities and storage durations can be substantial.

Alternative source qualification Identifying a second source for the component, either a different manufacturer producing the same device or a third party licensed to manufacture it. Alternative source qualification requires design equivalence testing and, in some programs, a PPAP or equivalent qualification process. It eliminates the dependency on a single manufacturer but requires time and engineering resource.

Redesign and COTS insertion Redesigning the affected circuit to use a currently available commercial component. COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) insertion programs within the DoD have been a deliberate strategy since the 1994 Perry Memo, which shifted DoD procurement policy away from MIL-SPEC components toward commercial alternatives where technically acceptable. Redesign is the most structurally complete resolution, but it requires engineering effort, design re-verification, and where applicable, re-qualification of the modified system.

FPGA emulation For discontinued application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and complex logic devices, FPGA emulation involves re-implementing the original device's functionality in a current-generation programmable logic device. This has been used successfully in radar, avionics, and communication systems where the original ASIC is no longer manufacturable and no production-equivalent alternative exists. Emulation requires detailed knowledge of the original device's specification and thorough functional verification.

Bridge sourcing from the secondary market Where the LTB window has passed or the required quantity cannot be sourced through authorized channels, verified secondary market stock may bridge the gap while a longer-term resolution is implemented. For defense applications, secondary market sourcing requires rigorous inspection to AS6081 and documentation sufficient to support DFARS compliance.

Class K and Radiation-Hardened Components

For space and some high-reliability defense applications, the component requirement is not simply for a standard commercial or industrial grade device. Class K (space grade) components, qualified under MIL-PRF-38534 (hybrid microcircuits) or MIL-PRF-38535 (monolithic microcircuits), are produced in limited volumes to radiation tolerance and reliability requirements that commercial devices do not meet.

When a Class K device reaches end of life, the resolution options are more constrained than for commercial-grade parts. The pool of manufacturers producing radiation-hardened (rad-hard) semiconductors is small. Alternative source qualification requires not only electrical equivalence testing but radiation characterisation. Redesign to a different architecture may require radiation analysis of the new design. The secondary market for genuine Class K devices exists but requires careful verification of lot traceability and radiation test documentation.

Counterfeit Risk in Defense Sourcing

The Senate Armed Services Committee investigation demonstrated that counterfeit parts enter the defense supply chain primarily through open market purchases from unauthorized distributors. The risk is highest when procurement is driven by urgency (a platform is grounded, a system is down) and authorized channels cannot supply the required part in the required timeframe.

In those conditions, the temptation to source quickly from any available supplier is real and the consequences of sourcing a counterfeit are severe: DFARS reporting obligations, potential False Claims Act exposure, and the operational consequences of a counterfeit part in a safety-critical system.

The appropriate response to an urgent defense sourcing requirement is not to lower the verification standard. It is to apply rigorous AS6081-compliant inspection to whatever source is used, document the results, and maintain the records required for DFARS compliance.

How Maketronics Supports Defense and Aerospace Sourcing

Maketronics sources hard-to-find and obsolete components for defense and aerospace programs where authorized channels are exhausted. Our sourcing process applies the same discipline to every lot regardless of urgency: supply chain verification, date code consistency, and packaging integrity assessment before any recommendation is made.

For higher-risk requirements, Maketronics Assurance provides independent inspection with documented results, giving program quality teams the verification records they need to support DFARS compliance and change control documentation.

Managing a DMSMS event or a defense sourcing requirement where authorized supply is exhausted? Talk to the Maketronics team and we will advise on what the verified supply picture looks like.